Pace Gallery’s 2025 Accounts Reveal $5.4M Loss and Net Liabilities

Pace Gallery’s UK-led group recorded a $5.4 million after-tax loss in 2025, with cash at $11.1 million and net liabilities of $2.9 million; most roster and staffing cuts followed in 2026, although Pace closed its Hong Kong exhibition space in October 2025.

 
 

Pace Gallery’s 2025 Loss Was More Than a Sales Problem

The Companies House filing history records The Pace Gallery Limited’s accounts for the year ended December 31, 2025 as filed on October 26, 2026. That is the filing date, not the financial period: the figures describe business completed during 2025.

The headline $5.4 million result is the loss after tax. On a consistent pre-tax basis, the group moved from a $6.8 million profit in 2023 to an almost break-even $2,429 loss in 2024, then to a $5.5 million loss in 2025.

Metric	2023	2024	2025
Turnover	$104.9m	$67.7m	$65.9m
Pre-tax result	+$6.8m	−$2,429	−$5.5m
Cash	$34.8m	$24.1m	$11.1m
Net assets/(liabilities)	+$4.5m	+$2.5m	−$2.9m
Group payable to US parent	$17.3m	$9.4m	$9.9m
UK company balance owed to parent	Not tabulated	$19.2m	$21.3m

Turnover fell only 2.6% in 2025, following the much larger 35.5% contraction documented in Pace’s 2024 accounts. Across the full 2023–2025 period, turnover declined approximately 37%, but cash decreased about 68% and the pre-tax result deteriorated by $12.3 million.

The balance-sheet movement is equally consequential. Net assets of $4.5 million in 2023 became net liabilities of $2.9 million in 2025—a negative swing of approximately $7.4 million in two years.

Infographic by Art in Context, based on Artnet News.

 
 

What the UK-Led Pace Group Includes

These figures do not represent Pace Gallery’s entire worldwide business. The reporting entity is the London-registered The Pace Gallery Limited, company number 07117911, together with its consolidated subsidiaries and branches in Europe and Asia.

The perimeter includes the London business and subsidiaries in Hong Kong, mainland China, South Korea, and Switzerland, along with German operations conducted through the UK company. Pace’s United States headquarters and Tokyo gallery sit outside these accounts. The Geneva gallery pictured above is therefore inside the reported group, while Pace’s New York flagship is not.

That boundary matters when interpreting both the loss and the support available to the business. The accounts quantify a substantial international portion of Pace, but they do not establish the revenue, cash, debt, or profitability of the private gallery’s whole global organization. They also cannot show whether stronger or weaker US results offset the international group’s contraction.

Pace’s directors attributed the 2025 result to continued contraction in global and UK art markets and reluctance among some clients to buy. That is management’s explanation recorded in the accounts; the filing establishes the financial result but does not independently prove the cause assigned to it.

 

Pace Gallery in Geneva, photographed by Kalai Ramu. Hosted by Wikimedia Commons under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. Cropped.

 
 

Margin and Cash Fell Faster Than Turnover

The most revealing 2025 change sits between turnover and gross profit. Cost of sales increased by approximately 12% even as turnover slipped 2.6%, reducing gross profit from about $20.2 million in 2024 to $12.8 million in 2025.

Dividing gross profit by turnover produces a gross margin of roughly 29.8% in 2024 and 19.4% in 2025. That ten-percentage-point contraction explains why a relatively modest revenue decline coincided with a much larger loss. The accounts do not disclose enough transaction-level information to assign the change to particular artworks, artists, locations, or sale types.

Cash supplies a second measure of pressure. The group held $34.8 million at the end of 2023, $24.1 million in 2024, and $11.1 million in 2025. The two-year reduction was $23.7 million, or about 68%. A cash balance is not the same thing as annual profit or loss, but the sequence shows that the international group’s immediately available financial cushion narrowed substantially.

The filing presents two parent-company balances that should not be added together. The consolidated group reported $9.9 million payable to US parent Pace Gallery LLC, while the UK company’s separate balance owed to that parent reached $21.3 million. They arise from different accounting scopes rather than representing two independent piles of debt.

Pace plans to convert amounts owed to its US parent into shares by the end of 2026. A spokesperson told Artnet News that the proposal is a capital-structure decision and should not be interpreted as a loss or liquidity problem for the UK business. That is Pace’s characterization; the filed figures establish the liabilities and proposed conversion, not the broader assurance.

 
 

Pace’s Cuts Came After the Reported Loss

Timing separates the 2025 result from Pace’s most visible restructuring. The financial year closed on December 31, 2025. Most of Pace’s roster, staffing, exhibition, and real-estate restructuring was announced in 2026, but the gallery had already closed its Hong Kong exhibition space in October 2025.

In June 2026, Pace said it would focus on about 80 artists after planning to part with roughly 50 artists and estates. Around 20% of its approximately 250-person global workforce was also affected, according to contemporaneous reporting. Those are global figures, not a disclosed headcount for the UK-led group alone.

The accounts connect restructuring to fewer exhibitions, fewer full-time support roles, and lower property overhead. For artists, the institutional consequence is not abstract: a smaller roster and exhibition calendar change how much staff attention, gallery space, promotion, and collector access Pace can allocate to each represented practice.

Pace’s directors also recorded assurances that Pace Gallery LLC, Marc Glimcher, and Arne Glimcher would continue financial support and would not demand repayment for at least 12 months from approval of the accounts unless third-party liabilities had been satisfied.

That backing supports the directors’ use of the going-concern basis, but it is different from a completed recapitalization. The accounts still describe the debt conversion as an intended transaction. Likewise, Pace’s Hanover Square property has been marketed while the gallery plans a smaller London location for 2027, but the final premises and completed move remain future developments.

Pace Gallery CEO Marc Glimcher, photographed by Kris Graves. Hosted by Wikimedia Commons under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.

 
 

Pace’s Deficit Is Established; Its Fix Is Not

The 2025 accounts establish a $5.4 million after-tax loss, $11.1 million cash balance, and $2.9 million net-liability position for Pace’s UK-led European and Asian group. The three-year comparison shows that cash and profitability weakened more sharply than turnover, while the filing’s cost lines reduce gross margin to approximately 19.4%.

The accounts do not represent Pace’s US or Tokyo operations, and the major roster, staffing, exhibition, and property cuts happened after the reported year. The proposed parent-debt conversion could strengthen the balance sheet but had not yet been presented as completed; it would also reclassify existing support rather than generate artwork sales or new cash.

Pace’s next accounts will be the first statutory test of the June 2026 roster and staffing cuts and the planned London downsizing, while the 2025 accounts already cover the Hong Kong space’s October closure.